We study market equilibration in laboratory economies that are larger and more complex than any that have been studied experimentally to date. Complexity is derived from the fact that the economies are "international" in economic structure with multiple input, output, and foreign exchange markets in operation. The economies have twenty-one markets and due to the fact that they have roughly fifty agents, the economies are characterized by several hundred equations. In spite of the complexity and interdependence of the economy, the results demonstrate the substantial power of the general equilibrium model of perfect competition to predict the direction of movement of market-level variables. Empirical patterns in the convergence process are explored and described.
Introduction
Under the classical competitive equilibrium model, the simultaneous optimization by all participants in the economy, given prices, incentives, resources, and technology constraints, implies an outcome corresponding to a solution of a system of nonlinear excess demand equations. The number of such equations explodes as the number of commodities and resources increase, but the theory itself suggests no effects of the increased complexity. On the surface, the thought that a decentralized system of competitively interacting humans might approximate the solution as the number of equations grows large is a staggering and contentious proposition that many cannot believe without demonstration. The substance of this paper is a demonstration that equilibration is not beyond the capacity of a large economic system and that the principles at work are well approximated by classical general equilibrium theory applied to international economies. 1 Noussair: Department of Economics, Rich Memorial Building, Emory University, Atlanta, GA 30322-2240, USA. E-mail cnoussa@emory.edu. Plott: Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA 91125, USA. E-mail: cplott@hss.caltech.edu. Riezman: Department of Economics, University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA 52242, USA. E-mail: raymond-riezman@uiowa.edu. We thank Carol McAusland, Jacob Goeree, Zheng Liu, and seminar participants at Nottingham University, the Although the concept of equilibrium is static, part of its allure as a predictive model lies in a dynamic interpretation; that the movement of the economic variables will be in the direction of the equilibrium of the model. The empirical relevance of such a dynamic interpretation of the model is demonstrated in a growing body of experimental work that documents a convergence tendency in markets. That is, in many reported experiments, there is a tendency for markets to converge toward the competitive equilibria of corresponding theoretical models, and for the market activity to exhibit reduced variability in a neighborhood of the equilibrium prices and quantities. This convergence generalizes to a wide class of experimental economies, such as production economies with derived demand Plott and George, 1983) , exchange economies with two or more commodities (Forsythe et al. 1980; Plott and Sunder, 1988; Plott, 1988; Bossaerts et al. 2001; Plott, 2001; Williams et al., 2001; Chen and Plott, 2001) , and small general equilibrium systems with a circular flow of income (Lian and Plott, 1998) . 2 In such cases, Equilibration, a dynamic principle of system behavior, underlies the support for the law of supply and demand.
In this paper we investigate the properties of the equilibration process of experimental international market economies. These economies are far more complex that any laboratory economies created to date. The complexity is not only in terms of the number of commodities, markets and agents, but also in terms of the nature of the economic activities and their interdependence. In international economies, special types of market interdependencies arise because international demand for traded goods also influences derived demand for factors of production. Moreover, exchange rates exert direct feedback on all sectors of the economy and the demand and supply of foreign exchange are sensitive to various activities throughout the economy. The feasibility of studying simpler international economies has been established (Noussair et al., 1995 (Noussair et al., , 1997 ; Riedl and van Winden, 2001 ), together with a presumption that the University of Amsterdam, and the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology for helpful comments. We thank Steven Tucker and Tara Larson for research assistance. 2 While a dynamic process of price adjustment is in operation, it need not necessarily lead in the direction of the competitive equilibrium. The process can be unstable (Plott and George, 1990; Plott and Smith, 1999; Plott 2000) or cycle without apparent equilibration (Anderson et al., 2003) . 3 Noussair et al. (1995) consider two types of experimental international economies. The first has the structure of the Ricardian model, in which there are two countries, two output goods, and one input good. In the competitive equilibrium, full specialization by each country in one output is predicted. The authors observe convergence to the equilibrium, though input prices are lower than marginal products and tariffs reduce efficiency by a greater amount than is consistent with equilibrium comparative statics. The second type of economy has two inputs rather than one. Convergence to close to competitive equilibrium is also observed, and in both types of economy, trade flows are consistent with the Law of Comparative Advantage. While the economies studied in Noussair et al. (1995) have one currency common to both countries, Noussair et al. (1997) study experimental international exchange economies with two countries equilibration tendencies of systems of markets will survive in even the most complex of environments.
In the experiment reported here, the laboratory world is divided into three countries, where each country is characterized by its own currency, resource endowment, and production technology. There are three final goods, which can be produced in any of the three countries. Two input goods, both of which are required to produce any of the outputs, reside in each of the three countries. These factors of production are immobile, although outputs can be traded internationally. Markets exist for each output, input and currency. The simultaneous trade of several types of goods, factors of production, final goods, and currencies, provides a rich setting to study the principles of behavior of an entire general equilibrium economic system, with interdependencies beyond those that have been previously studied experimentally.
The paper is divided into five sections. The first section is this introduction. The second section describes the experimental environment together with the procedures and parameters.
Because this is the first experiment with this level of complexity, section two also includes some details about the interfaces and other aspects of the experiment. The third section is a summary of the models and terminology that are used in the results section. The analysis is conducted at the aggregate level to identify and explore patterns of behavior of economic systems rather than those of individuals. The concept of equilibration is expressed in a testable formulation called the The fourth section describes the results from the experiment and the last section presents and discusses the conclusions. After evaluating the equilibration hypothesis, which is supported in our data, the empirical characteristics of the equilibration process are explored. The behavior of variables such as national production, international trade, prices, wages, and exchange rates, are studied. Some properties of the equilibration process that appear in our data and that we believe are fairly general are identified.
The Experiment 2a. Overview of the Economy
The economies we constructed all had the structure shown in figure 1. There were three countries, A, B, and C. In each country there were agents who were suppliers. Suppliers were and two currencies. They find that trade patterns are consistent with the Law of Comparative Advantage, endowed with the ability to supply two resources, l and k, to input markets. In each country there were also agents who were producers. Each producer was endowed with a production capability and could produce one of three outputs x, y, and z using the inputs l and k. Finally, there were consumers who could purchase x, y, and z from producers on the output markets.
The final goods x, y, and z could trade freely internationally but the inputs l and k could not trade internationally. Each country had its own currency, labeled as A, B, or C, and all transactions within a country were required to take place in terms of domestic currency. We also imposed the requirement that only domestic currency had value to residents of a given country, and at the close of the market period all foreign currency was removed from the inventory of all agents.
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A cash-in-advance constraint was in effect on international transactions. Imports into country J could occur only when a resident of country J transported a good into country J. It was not possible for a resident of country J to transport goods produced in J to country K for sale there. This meant that a prospective purchaser from country K, who wished to purchase a good produced in country J, had to obtain country J currency before international trade could take place. To obtain foreign currency, agents could use currency markets that were operating in all three countries. The cash in advance constraint ensured that the currency markets would be active if international trade occurred.
The cash-in-advance requirement not only conforms to what happens in field economies, but is also helpful in terms of experimental design. Without this requirement it would be very difficult to precisely determine the equilibrium demand for foreign currency and hence, the calculation of predicted equilibrium would be problematic. We could have imposed the condition that producers sell to consumers in the consumer's home currency but we are confident that the qualitative results would be the same. The only difference would be which agents bear the foreign exchange risk. The important point to remember is that foreign exchange risk in experimental economies will exist no matter how the experiment is designed. This is because decisions are made sequentially and international transactions require introducing currency markets which creates an additional decision that agents must make. Thus, regardless of the experimental design, but the exchange rate deviates considerably from the Purchasing Power Parity level. 4 This is done so that the only sources of demand for currency were the importation of goods or intra-period speculation in the currency market. It would be interesting to allow foreign exchange to be carried over to future periods, which would reduce the risk associated with foreign purchases. However, this change would substantially complicate the experiment since all agents would have a speculative motivation to hold currencies over the entire length of the experiment.
Deleted: currency
Deleted: is typically actually the case there must be agents who must buy and sell foreign currency before they know the transaction price and quantity of the commodities they are trading. This creates an unavoidable risk.
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For the economy to maximize gains from trade, the following pattern of activity must occur. Suppliers sell inputs l and k to producers in their own country. Producers purchase domestic l and k and use them in the production of the outputs x, y, or z. Producers then sell the outputs to domestic and foreign consumers. Consumers purchase x, y, and z from domestic and/or foreign producers. To purchase a good from a foreign producer the consumer first buys the currency of the country from which he wishes to import. Supply of the foreign currency originates from foreign consumers who also wish to import goods into their own country.
[ Figure 1 : About Here]
2b. Parameters
Subjects had several sources of incentives. Consumers' valuations for outputs x, y, and z were induced by assigning them exogenous values in terms of domestic currency. If a consumer purchased and later consumed a unit at a price below its valuation to him, he would earn a profit on the unit. The marginal valuations for an individual consumer for the outputs decreased as he consumed more. Suppliers' costs to supply the inputs l and k were also induced. 6 They were required to pay a marginal cost for each unit they wished to sell, and would make a profit on a unit if the price at which it sold was greater than its marginal cost.
Incentives for consumption activities are denoted as U (x,y,z) . Consumers had induced values for the three goods. The utilities were in terms of home currency, which would be converted into U.S. dollars at the end of the experiment. The induced preferences of a consumer i, in terms of U.S. dollars, had the form 7 :
5 It is certainly the case that removing all of an individual's inventory of foreign currency after each period is an additional and substantial source of risk, beyond the risk that the separate timing of currency and good transactions creates. The full loss of foreign currency imposes a risk that is more extreme than the exchange risk that typically exists in the field. However, even without this feature, the timing of transactions creates an unavoidable risk. The only way to eliminate this form of risk is to have a single currency in the economy. 6 The variable names V and W were used to refer to the inputs in the interface that the subjects saw. The purpose was to avoid any possible suggestion that the inputs referred to labor and capital. To facilitate their interpretation as factors of production, for purposes of exposition we refer to V as l and W as k in this paper. 7 This is the general form of the utility function. In the actual utility functions we use in the experiment, some of these parameters are set to zero for some individuals. Supplying resources is costly to the supplier and thus enters as a negative in a utility calculation. The cost of supplying resources is denoted as C (l,k) . The incentives of suppliers are derived from their ability to acquire resources at a cost in terms of home currency and sell them for home currency at a profit. The induced cost to a supplier i of inputs is quadratic, separable in the two inputs, and approximated with the following functional form:
Each producer had the capacity to transform the two resources into one of the three outputs. This ability to transform goods represents a production capability. By purchasing the resources with home currency, producing the output, and selling it for home currency, the producer could make a profit in terms of home currency, which would later be converted to dollars. Therefore, producers had an incentive to maximize profits in terms of home currency.
Let f J m (k,l) denote the production function of a producer in country J for output m. The production function of individual i took the form 8 :
.
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Each participant was assigned one of twelve possible types. The types indicated the participant's country of residence, as well as the incentives and production technologies at their disposal. Most types had more than one role as consumer, producer or supplier, although no subject was both a producer and a supplier, and no subject was both a producer and a consumer of the same good. These restrictions ensured that all inputs used in production and all outputs consumed were traded between different individuals so that the price of every unit transacted of every good could be measured and recorded. 
2c. The Interface
In the experimental economies, 21 markets, in which all subjects could participate at all times, were in operation. There were seven markets located in each country. Each country contained a market for each of the three outputs x, y, and z, and for each of the two inputs l and k.
Each country also contained two currency markets. In each currency market, domestic currency could be exchanged for one of the two foreign currencies. All markets followed continuous double auction rules. The experiment was computerized and used the Marketscape platform developed at the California Institute of Technology. The computer program was written in PERL and runs on the LINUX operating system. Each subject accessed the markets using a web browser. The principal interface for the subjects was the Market Summary Screen, illustrated in figure 2.
[Figures 2 and 3: About Here]
There was one market screen corresponding to each country and there were links on the bottom of the screen that allowed the user to move between countries. Subjects could submit offers to buy or sell by filling out the rightmost portion of the screen. The subject specified whether the offer was to buy or sell, the good offered, the number of units, the price, and the time period for which the offer was to be available. The order book for each good was displayed on a screen that subjects reached if they selected the name of the market on their main screen. To accept an offer another participant submitted, an agent could select a box next to the offer she was accepting.
The demand functions of consumers for final goods and the supply functions of suppliers for inputs were stationary from period to period. Consumers could sell units of x, y, and z to the experimenter, and receive cash in return. These sales were considered consumption and the cash received for the sale, which was added to the cash balance of the consumer, represented the utility of consumption. Similarly, suppliers could purchase units of l and k from the experimenter at predetermined prices for resale to producers. The price the supplier paid for each unit represented the marginal cost of supplying that unit and was deducted from the supplier's earnings.
The links at the bottom of the screen illustrated in figure 2 illustrate the information available at any time to participants. At any time, subjects could access the current offers available to every domestic and foreign market. In addition to being able to view all current offers in all markets, they could go to pages that would list their own history of offers and a history of transactions for each good for the current and all previous periods of the experiment. The latter information was available in both text and graphical form. They could also select Announcements and receive public messages from the experimenter.
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A producer's production function was displayed in the manner shown in figure 3 . The numbers in the table correspond to the total output that could be produced with given quantities of the two inputs within a period. The numbers in the table form an isoquant map of the producer's production function. Production was restricted to integer amounts. Over the course of a period, as inputs were used in production, a highlighted cursor would track input use from the origin outward. This facilitated the calculation of the current marginal product at any point in time. To produce output subjects used another, interactive screen that allowed them to calculate hypothetically the quantity they could produce with different combinations of inputs before they committed themselves to the irreversible production decision. To produce, they typed input quantities in designated fields.
2d. The Sessions
Three independent experiments were conducted. Experiment 1 took place during three three-hour sessions on three different days, and experiments 2 and 3 during two four-hour sessions on two different days. The same subject took part in all of the sessions that made up an individual experiment, but no subject took part in more than one experiment. In experiment 1, there were 60 participants, 46 of whom were undergraduates at Purdue University and 14 of whom were undergraduates at the California Institute of Technology. In experiment 1, all subjects were located in the economics laboratories at Purdue University and the California Institute of Technology during the sessions. In experiments 2 and 3, there were 40 and 57 subjects,
respectively, who were all undergraduate students at Caltech. Sessions 2 and 3 were conducted remotely with all subjects connecting from outside the laboratory over the Internet using a web browser.
The experiments consisted of a sequence of periods. All markets were open for the entire duration of each period. In each period all values of the parameters were reinitialized to the same starting values so that the underlying parameters remained the same within each period of a given experiment. Thus, there was no ability to carry over inventories or to accumulate capital from period to period. Experiment 1 consisted of 12 periods and experiments 2 and 3 consisted of 16
periods. Each period was between 20 and 30 minutes in length. The time remaining in the current period was always common knowledge.
2e. Competitive equilibrium
Application of the model of perfect competition can be used to produce market demand functions for each commodity in each country. These are themselves complex, being derived from individual maximization theory, inverted and summed across agents. Thus, the summary equations in this subsection represent a major simplification of the economic environment that existed.
The demand functions of individual consumers for the three outputs in each of the three currency B trade for one unit of currency A). r C is the exchange rate of currency C for A. For J = {B, C} and m = {x, y, z}:
The final three equations reflect the flow of funds theory of exchange rates. They require that exchange rates adjust so that the demand for foreign exchange as dictated by imports equals the supply of foreign exchange as dictated by exports. Since the third equation is a linear combination of the first two, only (7) and (8) are used to compute the competitive equilibrium.
Market demands and supplies can be calculated in a straightforward manner from the individual demands and the data in tables 1 and 2. value to him at the end of the trading period, in order to make purchases in a foreign country. The currency market purchases must be of a sufficient quantity to allow the importer to complete the foreign purchases, yet not be of such a large quantity that unspent foreign currency cannot be resold for domestic currency before the end of the period. If an insufficient number of agents are willing to engage in international trade, the currency markets may become thin, eventually discouraging all traders from using them, and as a consequence causing the disappearance of international trade. Conceptually, in the light of complexity, risk aversion, and transactions costs, autarky might be the only stable equilibrium so it cannot be simply dismissed without examination.
Statistical Methodology
The Equilibration Hypothesis has two components, Reduced Variability and
Convergence. Reduced variability is a notion of decreasing variability of the value of a marketlevel variable over time, where a unit of time is defined as a market period. It can be defined for any input price, output price, exchange rate, or the quantity produced, traded and consumed of any good at either the national or international level.
To evaluate whether or not reduced variability is occurring, we calculate the normalized standard deviation of prices, wages, exchange rates, production, and international trade flows. We divide the data from each experiment into two segments of equal length, and designate the two segments as the early and the late periods of the experiment. For experiment 1, the early and late periods comprise periods 1-6 and 7-12, respectively. In experiments 2 and 3, the early and late periods correspond to periods 1-8 and 9-16, respectively. For the price variables, output prices, wages and exchange rates, the normalized standard deviation is defined as
the standard deviation of all transaction prices in market m during the late periods of experiment i, and μ im L is the average transaction price in the late periods of experiment i. σ im E and μ im E are analogous variables for the first half (the early periods) of the experiments. For trade flows and production, the same variables are calculated, although the total quantity imported or produced in each period is the unit of observation, rather than the individual transaction.
We say that reduced variability is occurring in a market if In later periods of experiment i the D i /t term decreases toward 0, while the variable (t-1)/t increases toward 1. If t were projected to the infinite future, (t-1)/t would converge to 1.
Therefore β 2 can be interpreted as the asymptote to which the time series is converging. We will refer to the β 2 estimate as the Convergence Value of the variable. The specification assumes that there is a common value to which the time series is converging for all experiments. We will say that we cannot reject the hypothesis that a variable converges to its competitive equilibrium value if the estimated β 2 is not significantly different from zero. The standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity to account for stabilization, which would decrease the variance of the error terms for later periods in the sessions.
Results

The equilibration hypothesis
Figures 4 -6 illustrate the price patterns observed in experiment three, which are typical for the three economies we studied. Figure 4 shows the average transaction prices for the three outputs during each period in each of the three countries in experiment three in comparison with the competitive equilibrium prices, shown in bold horizontal lines. Figure 5 contains the analogous data for input prices. Figure 6 illustrates the average exchange rate, as well the competitive equilibrium exchange rate, and the level that would be consistent with Purchasing Power Parity given the actual average prices in the three countries. It is apparent from the figures that the values of many of the variables differ substantially from the competitive equilibrium levels. For example, the price of z in country B is roughly 50% higher than the competitive equilibrium level for most of the experiment. The prices of y and z in country C are higher than the equilibrium by similar percentages. The exchange rate of currency C to A is roughly 40% higher than the predicted rate of 5.17. However, the time series also suggest that many of the variables are closer to the equilibrium levels in the late periods than in the early periods, suggesting that equilibration, as defined in section 1, may be taking place. For example, in country C, the prices of k, x, y, and z are noticeably closer to their equilibrium levels in the late periods of the experimental session than early on. The same is true for k and x in country B. Result 1 and its supporting discussion summarize the balance of the evidence on equilibration in our data.
[ Table 3 contains the competitive model predictions for each of 23 system level variables in the experiment. In addition, the competitive equilibrium implies a level of production of each good in each country, yielding predictions for 9 more variables. Since there are three independent experiments, these data make up 96 time series. The equilibration hypothesis asserts that (a) the variance in the variables of the economy declines over time (reduced variability) and (b) the variables attain values closer to the equilibrium over time (convergence). Operationally, as described in section three, we define an economy to be equilibrating if significantly more than 50% of the price and quantity variables exhibit declining variance and means closer to the competitive equilibrium in the late periods than in the early periods.
We find that reduced variability is occurring in the experimental economies. We reject the hypotheses that 50% or fewer of the prices (at p < .01) and that 50% or fewer of the quantities (at p < .05) are converging. Therefore, convergence is also taking place in the economies.
Thus, although the pattern is less obvious than in previous experimental studies of simpler economies, there exists evidence that the economic variables are closer in the late periods than in the early periods to a common attractor, their equilibrium values. They also exhibit less variation in the late than in the early periods. The tables show that many of the convergence values, described by the β 2 coefficients, are significantly different from zero, indicating that even if we extrapolate our data to the distant future, we cannot conclude that they converge asymptotically to values precisely equal to the competitive equilibrium. Thus, assuming the convergence process follows the structure of (10), there appears to be some degree of deviation from the competitive equilibrium, even in the long run. This is consistent with the visual impression gained from observation of figures 4 -6.
Nevertheless, the regressions support the notion that an equilibration process, albeit incomplete, is taking place in the economy. The β 2 coefficients are closer to zero than the β 1j coefficients for 16 of 27 output prices (where each comparison is between a β 2 and one of the β 1j coefficient from the same estimated equation), 12 of 18 wages, and 6 of 6 exchange rates. The convergence is more evident for quantities transacted. For 15 of the 18 import variables and 21 of the 27 production variables, β 2 is closer to zero than the corresponding β 11 , …, β 13 terms. The production variables have β 2 coefficients greater than the corresponding β 1j terms in 26 of 27 instances indicating that output is increasing over time. The result that convergence in the direction of equilibrium is stronger for quantities than for prices is consistent with results obtained in the simpler international economies studied by Noussair et al. (1995 Noussair et al. ( , 1997 .
12 12 We can measure the amount of the increase in output that is due to increasing factor utilization by producers and the amount that is due to productivity increases (increasing output per unit of input), by calculating a version of the Solow (1957) residual, which is the component of increased output that greater utilization of factors cannot explain. Factor utilization in the economy increases by an average of 14.14%
Properties of the equilibration process
In this subsection we conduct an exploratory analysis of the production, trade and price data, and study the empirical characteristics of the equilibration process in our economies. We investigate whether the equilibration process is characterized by consistent and regular dynamics. The regressions in tables 4 -6 reveal several interesting patterns about the nature of the equilibration process. The first pattern is that the estimated β 2 coefficients tend to deviate from the equilibrium in the direction of autarky. Under autarky, the prices of the goods that would be exported under free trade, x A , y B and z C , are lower than in the competitive equilibrium, and the quantity of these goods produced is below the competitive equilibrium level. The output prices and quantities produced for the remaining six outputs are higher in autarky than in the competitive equilibrium.
The import variables are all equal to zero in autarky and positive in the competitive equilibrium.
The convergence values tend to lie between the competitive equilibrium and the autarky levels.
This pattern is similar to the home bias often noted in the study of field data, since it reveals the presence of lower international trade than the fundamentals of the economies would predict, even when taking into account transportation costs, tariffs, and other measurable variables. Price patterns are also consistent with the presence of a home bias. We will refer to the tendency of the economies to deviate from their equilibria in the direction of autarky as the home bias property.
Property 1: The Home Bias Property -A home bias in trade exists. Observed trade and production levels deviate from competitive model predictions in direction of autarky.
Support for property 1: All of the β 2 coefficients in table 5 for the variables indicating import quantities and the location of the production of the three goods differ from zero in the direction of autarky. The levels of imports are all lower than in the competitive equilibrium, as are the levels of production of the goods that a country exports (the variables Prod x A , Prod y B , Prod z C ). All of the other production levels are greater than in the competitive equilibrium, indicating that more production of these goods for domestic consumption occurs than predicted. Six of eight β 2 coefficients for output prices deviate from the competitive model in the direction of autarky (p y B is not significantly different from the competitive level at the 5% level of significance).
per period from periods 1 to 3 and .58% per period thereafter. Productivity increases by an average of 7.87% per period from periods 1 to 3 and .65 % per period thereafter.
This "Home Bias Puzzle" has given rise to many alternative theories to explain why there is less international trade than theory predicts. 13 Among those explanations are imperfect contract enforcement (Anderson and Marcouiller, 1999,) differences in legal systems (Turrini and Van Ypersele, 2001,) intermediate goods trade (Hillberry and Hummels, 2002,) and information/networks (Rauch, 2001 .) While these explanations may be plausible for accounting for the field data, none of these are factors in our laboratory experiments. In the experiments, convergence toward the general equilibrium takes place from the direction of autarky, which corresponds to 100% home bias. Thus, a slow or incomplete adjustment to equilibrium would retain a lingering property of home bias. Furthermore, if a change in the underlying environment moved the equilibrium toward increased international trade, a less than instantaneous equilibration process would also have the home bias property.
One might be tempted to think that the cash-in-advance constraint and the fact that individual balances of foreign currency disappeared after each period accounts for the home bias in our economies. However, any experimental design that features multiple currencies will have some agents engaging in international trade having to make a sequence of decisions, and risk generated by this sequential timing. That is, decisions about how much of a good to buy and sell and at what price must be made at a different point in time than the decision about how much foreign exchange to buy or sell and at what exchange rate. This creates inherent risk in foreign transactions that does not exist for domestic transactions. We believe that it is this risk that creates "home bias" and will be part of the environment no matter how the mechanics of the foreign exchange are structured. We also suspect that this type of risk is present not only in our experimental environment, but also in field economies.
Property 1 concerns the quantities of goods traded in our economies. Properties 2 and 3 below describe the behavior of transaction prices. We have already noted that prices tend to deviate from the Competitive Model predictions in the direction of autarky. However, in addition 13 Home bias in field data has been carefully documented in McCallum (1995) for example. McCallum's work points to a very large border effect so that the spatial location of trade matters a great deal. He finds that trade between two Canadian provinces is more than twenty times larger than trade between one of the provinces and a US state of similar size and distance. However, in our experimental world there is no spatial element and no borders. So, the home bias we find in our data cannot be due to border effects. Anderson (2000) surveys recent empirical work on the existence of home bias in international trade in commodities and concludes that, "The evidence points to very large missing transactions costs of international trade." He then suggests possible sources of transaction costs that include information costs, imperfect contract enforcement, insecurity, and non-diversifiable risks. In our laboratory environment, the information is the same for domestic and foreign purchases, contract enforcement and security are not issues and the type of risk considered by Anderson does not arise in our environment. So, our finding of home bias suggests that the missing transactions costs may be due, at least in part, to the out-of-equilibrium dynamics of market convergence, in addition to those causes postulated in the literature.
to the mean prices following a particular pattern relative to the equilibrium level, we also find that the variances in input and output prices exhibit consistent patterns. Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2000) . In our data we also find that exchange rates tend to be more volatile than other prices. 
We consider the late periods of each experiment. In experiment 1, the pooled normalized standard deviation of prices in the input markets is greater than that of the output markets in each of the three countries. In experiments 2 and 3, the input markets exhibit greater pooled normalized standard deviations than the output markets in 2 of the 3 countries. Thus, in seven of nine possible cases, there is more variability in national producer prices than in consumer prices.
We also calculate the pooled average normalized standard deviation of prices in the late periods in the currency markets and compare them to those of prices in the six world input markets (two markets in each country) and the nine world output markets. In each of the three experiments, the normalized standard deviation of prices is greater in the currency markets than in the input markets as well as in the output markets.
Thus, it appears that input and output markets behave differently in some respects from each other and from foreign exchange markets. The greater price variance in input than in output markets may reflect a relatively slow speed of adjustment of markets, such as factor markets, where demand is derived, rather than exogenous, as in the output markets. Such a principle is consistent with the high variance observed in exchange rates, since demand for foreign exchange is also derived. The markets tend to stabilize "backwards", beginning with the final goods market, and followed by input markets. Thus, a version of the "Swingback Hypothesis" (Forsythe et al. 1982) , observed in experimental asset markets, appears to be at work in our economies.
14 Markets for foreign exchange are of special interest to economists. It has been noted in field studies that exchange rates exhibit persistent departures from purchasing power parity levels. As the support of property 3 documents, there are deviations from purchasing power parity in our data as well, but they tend to diminish over time. Figure 6 illustrates this pattern, and shows that during the convergence process exchange rates track ever more closely over time the level that corresponds to Purchasing Power Parity, the exchange rate that would equalize 14 In repeated markets for two-period assets, the final period transaction price tends to converge to near its rational expectations equilibrium price before the first period transaction price does.
The weighted output price averages for each country in the numerator and the denominator of (11) use the actual world production (which is always equal to world consumption) of each good as the weight for the good in the consumption bundle (j indexes the country). In our data, we find that the exchange rates tend to converge toward the PPP level, even when the PPP level departs from the competitive equilibrium. Although the output markets might be in disequilibrium, the currency market prices adjust in the direction of equalizing purchasing power in the two countries. While the movement of exchange rates is toward PPP, this convergence is not complete even asymptotically. As table 6 reveals, the exchange rate of currency C for A does not reach the PPP level. Of course, since prices in the goods markets are not at equilibrium levels in all markets, the Law of One Price will fail to hold for some goods. However, the β 2 term for r A -r A PPP is significantly different from zero at the p < .05 level.
[ Table 6 : About Here]
Property 4 encompasses two characteristics of prices of final goods. The first is that final goods prices tend to be greater than the competitive model predictions. This is consistent with previous experimental work on multiple-market economies Noussair et al., 1995) . The second is that the greater consumer surplus is, relative to the competitive equilibrium revenue in the market, the farther the average transaction price is above the competitive prediction. Since all market demand curves for final goods in our economies are linear, the statement is equivalent to the assertion that the steeper the demand function, holding the competitive equilibrium price and quantity constant, the more the price exceeds the competitive prediction. This pattern is somewhat reminiscent of the rent asymmetry effect studied by Smith and Williams (1982) . They note that prices in single market economies tend to converge to equilibrium prices from above when equilibrium consumer surplus exceeds producer surplus, and from below when producer surplus is greater than consumer surplus. In essence, prices in our markets are higher relative to equilibrium prices when they have upward flexibility, that is, when high prices have relatively small consequences on the quantity exchanged.
Property 4: The Surplus Price Adjustment Property for Final Goods -Output prices are
higher than in the competitive equilibrium. The difference between observed and equilibrium output prices tends to be greater, the greater the ratio of consumer surplus to equilibrium expenditure.
Support for property 4: Table 3 shows that for eight of the nine outputs in the economy, the convergence value is positive and for seven of nine it is significantly positive, indicating that output prices tend to converge to levels greater than competitive equilibrium values. We compare the correlation between the following two variables for each good in each country (nine total goods). The first variable is Property 5 is a relationship between output and input prices that was previously observed in other experimental studies (Noussair et al., 1995; Hey and di Cagno, 2000; Riedl and van Winden, 2001) . The relationship also appears here. Noussair et al. observed that the ratio of input to output prices was below the competitive equilibrium ratio in their data. They explained the deviation from the competitive equilibrium ratios as a compensation for a risk that producers undertook, and they referred to the price pattern as the Risk Compensated Input/Output Price Adjustment Property. The source of the risk lies in the fact that producers must commit themselves to purchase inputs that have no value other than in the irreversible production of an output to be sold later at a price that is unknown at the time of the input purchase. To compensate them for the risk they bear, producers earn a premium over the amount they would earn in the competitive equilibrium. We find that the Risk Compensated Input/Output Price Adjustment Property generalizes in a straightforward way to the economies studied here, although not quite as consistently. This risk premium, along with the inefficiencies in production arising from the misallocation of input between firms and suboptimal input mixes within firms, appears to account for the fact that output prices exceed the competitive predictions. An example is shown in figure 7 . We believe that declining prices within periods in these markets (resale of units purchased is permitted in all markets) occurs at least in part because the option of resale later in the period increases the value of units obtained early in the period. The observation that the Sawtooth Property does not appear in our foreign exchange markets supports this interpretation. Unlike in an input or an output market, the option value of resale of foreign currency exists for both parties to the transaction. Each party to a foreign exchange transaction is a "purchaser" of a "good", a foreign currency (domestic currency can be thought of as the money used to purchase the good), which has more value when acquired earlier in the market period. The premia resulting from the option value of resale for the two parties may thus have a tendency to offset, and the result is the absence of the Sawtooth pattern in the currency markets.
[ Figure 7 : About Here]
Conclusions
Experimental economics has produced a growing body of evidence supporting a principle of market convergence toward the equilibrium of the competitive model. The competitive equilibrium is defined as a solution to a system of simultaneous equations and is thus a static concept. However, the equilibration process is dynamic and is influenced by human behavior resulting from bounded rationality, heterogeneous beliefs, and learning. These uncontrolled features of behavior interact with technological and institutional constraints such as irreversible production, cash-in-advance constraints, undiversifiable risk, and the particular institutions of exchange in effect, to produce a dynamic process of activity over time. Our understanding of this convergence process is empirical so a natural question exists about the robustness of the stylized facts of market convergence.
The research reported here created an economic system far larger and more complex than anything studied experimentally in the past and focused on three issues. The first is the robustness of the most basic principles of market behavior to matters of scale. We consider whether behaviors observed in small-scale laboratory economies are also observed at a larger, more complex scale. Are larger scale economies orderly and similar to smaller scale versions or does chaos ensue with scale? Do new and different principles emerge to govern system behavior or do the same principles observed operating in smaller economies still apply?
Our data demonstrate that chaos does not ensue as the complexity of the economy
increases. An equilibration process is clearly evident in the sense that the movements of economic variables are in the direction of the general competitive equilibrium of the appropriate At least in our economies, the above properties appear to be properties of the equilibration process as opposed to consequences of special institutions, policy variables or exogenous shocks. Of course, our findings do not imply that patterns observed in field data are not affected by shocks or policy, but they do raise the possibility that the patterns observed in the field are characteristics of the process of market equilibration of international economies. In principle, the methodology we have used here, the exploration of the laboratory data for patterns that appear in field data, may be successfully applied in reverse. In particular, the empirical patterns observed in experiments might be used to motivate conjectures about patterns that might appear in field data produced in naturally occurring economies.
We close with the conjecture that the patterns of convergence we observe in our experiments will be observed operating at much larger scales than we were able to create for this study. We saw nothing about the operation of these economies that would suggest that the basic principles of economic behavior would be severely modified by scale. The results reported here suggest that much larger market systems are beyond neither the human capacities of participants in the economies nor beyond the reach of laboratory experimental methods. 
